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 LAND HO! TWO WORDS AN INJURED LONGSHORE 
OR HARBOR WORKER  
NEVER WANTS TO HEAR 
Adam Hare+ 
Two longshoremen1 are working in different maritime shipping yards: one in 
Newark, New Jersey, the other in Houston, Texas.  Both men are injured when 
his cargo truck overturns several hundred yards from the dock.  Under the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), only one of the 
workers will be compensated for his injuries. 2  This inequitable result is a 
function of inconsistent interpretations of the LHWCA’s situs requirement by 
several U.S. Courts of Appeals.3 
To be covered by the LHWCA, a claimant must satisfy two requirements: a 
status requirement and a situs4 requirement.5  The status requirement is met if, 
at the time of an accident, the person seeking coverage under the LHWCA was 
an employee engaged in maritime activity. 6   The situs requirement limits 
 + J.D. Candidate, May 2015, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.A., 
2006, The University of Maryland, College Park.  The author wishes to thank his wife, Lovely 
Padua-Hare, for her love and unwavering support in life.  He wishes also to thank his family.  The 
author thanks Dr. Michael Boyle and Dr. Beryl Rosenstein of Johns Hopkins Hospital, without 
whose care the author’s life would not be possible.  Finally, the author wishes to thank Alexander 
C. Papandreou and Michael Wray for their expertise and generosity while writing this Comment, 
and the staff and board members of the Catholic University Law Review for their tremendous 
efforts. 
 1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1027–28 (9th ed. 2009) (defining longshoreman as “[a] 
maritime laborer who works on the wharves in a port; esp., a person who loads and unloads ships”). 
 2. See Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) 
(2012) (providing that employees shall be compensated for “injur[ies] occurring upon the navigable 
waters of the United States”). 
 3. See New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 718 
F.3d 384, 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (Steward, J., dissenting) (recognizing the circuit court split regarding 
the proper interpretation of the LHWCA’s situs requirement). 
 4. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY supra note 1, at 1513 (defining situs as “[t]he location or 
position (of something) for legal purposes . . . the law of the place where the thing in issue is 
situated”). 
 5. See Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414, 415–16 (1985) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 
903(a)) (interpreting the LHWCA to include both a status and a situs requirement); see also 33 
U.S.C. § 903(a) (“[C]ompensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or 
death of an employee, but only if the disability or death results from an injury occurring upon the 
navigable waters of the United States . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 6. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (providing examples of what is and is not considered “engag[ing] in 
maritime employment” for the purposes of defining “employee” under the LHWCA); see also Dir., 
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini North River Assocs., 459 U.S. 297, 323–24 (1983) 
(relying on the LHWCA’s maritime employment language as a basis for determining the meaning 
of the Act’s status requirement).  For a thorough reading of the status requirement of the LHWCA, 
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coverage to employees involved in accidents occurring on or around “navigable 
waters.” 7   Consistent interpretation of these requirements, which the situs 
requirement currently lacks, is crucial because it is a question of law, and a 
judge, not a jury, will be the ultimate arbiter on the issue.8 
Congress passed the LHWCA in 19279 and comprehensively amended it in 
1972.10  The exact boundaries of the Act’s situs requirement developed through 
case law.11  Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court of the United States has 
offered guidance regarding the precise and proper interpretation of the Act’s 
situs requirement.12 
In the 1983 case Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. 
Perini North River Associates,13 the Supreme Court offered guidance to the 
circuit courts on how the LHWCA’s status requirement should be interpreted.14  
The Supreme Court has not provided similar guidance on the situs 
requirement, 15 even though the requirement was drafted in the hope that a 
particularly how the Supreme Court interpreted the 1972 Amendments to include land-based 
injuries, see generally Lawrence M. Merlin, Comment, On the Waterfront: The Supreme Court 
Defines the ‘Status’ Requirement of ‘Maritime Employment’, 8 MAR. LAW. 147 (1983) (discussing 
the evolution of the jurisprudence regarding the LHWCA’s status requirement). 
 7. See Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 263–64 (1977) (stating that 
the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA “broadened the definition of ‘navigable waters’ to include 
‘any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining 
area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel’” 
(quoting 33 U.S.C. § 903(a))). 
 8. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 635 
(3d Cir. 1976) (finding that workers’ compensation claims under the LHWCA are a matter of law 
because the LHWCA “concern[s] subject matter within Congress’ legislative jurisdiction in 
admiralty, [and] it is well-settled that no right to jury trial exists”). 
 9. Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), ch. 509, 44 Stat. 
1424 (1927) (codified as amended 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950). 
 10. See P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 73–75 (1979) (stating that Congress responded 
to gaps in coverage with the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA by providing coverage for on-shore 
employees). 
 11. In numerous cases, courts cite frequently to the LHWCA, yet these cases hardly refer to, 
let alone cite, other federal laws pertaining to modern regulation of maritime workers’ 
compensation claims.  See, e.g., Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 508–16 (5th 
Cir. 1980) (en banc), overruled by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ 
Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d, 394 (5th Cir. 2013); Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 
F.2d 137, 140–41 (9th Cir. 1978); Sea-Land Serv., 540 F.2d at 638–39. 
 12. Thomas C. Fitzhugh III, Adjoining Navigable Waters: Circuit Conflicts on LHWCA Situs 
(Oct. 18, 2013) (explaining that “[d]etermining the extent to which Congress moved jurisdiction 
landward has been the source of continuous litigation since 1972,” and pointing out that “the 
Supreme Court has shown little interest in resolving circuit conflicts” that have led to differing 
outcomes over interpretation of the situs requirement). 
 13. 459 U.S. 297 (1983). 
 14. Id. at 317–18 (noting that the legislative intention of the status requirement was to limit 
the coverage of the LHWCA to those workers engaged in maritime activity). 
 15. Claire R. Pitre, Comment, Muddying Waters—Clarifying Maritime Coverage Under the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 59 LOY. L. REV. 981, 996 (“Because the 
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compendium of case law would develop and define the term.16  Consequently, 
the Supreme Court should adopt a bright line rule to clarify the divergent circuit 
court interpretations of the situs requirement of the LHWCA. 
Since the LHWCA’s adoption, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, 
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have adopted different interpretations of the situs 
requirement. 17   In Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ 
Compensation Programs, 18 the Third Circuit held broadly that, if the status 
requirement of the LHWCA is met, then the situs requirement of the Act is also 
met.19  Additionally, in Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, the Fifth Circuit 
Supreme Court has addressed and clarified the status requirements under the Longshore Act, 
interpretation of the status requirement by the lower courts has not resulted in as much 
inconsistency and unpredictability as judicial interpretation and application of the Longshore Act’s 
situs requirement.”). 
 16. See Sea-Land Serv., 540 F.2d at 635–36 (discussing how Congress seemingly wanted 
adjudicative bodies to determine LHWCA requirements because of the constitutional limitations in 
admiralty law).  Not only does the situs requirement ask a federal judge to determine what 
constitutes “navigable waters,” but it also asks a judge to interpret the word “around.”  Fontenot v. 
AWI, Inc., 923 F.2d 1127, 1131 (5th Cir. 1991).  Courts also must construe a non-exhaustive list 
of geographical areas included as “adjoining” areas under the LHWCA.  See 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) 
(listing the following areas that Congress has decided will meet the situs requirement in the 
LHWCA: “any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal, building way, marine railway, or other 
adjoining area customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, dismantling, or 
building a vessel”). 
  The cases that construe the situs requirement of the LHWCA broadly seem to mirror the 
desire of the Supreme Court that, as stated in Voris v. Eikel, claimants be given the benefit of a 
liberal construction of the original LHWCA to “avoid[] harsh and incongruous results.”  Voris v. 
Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953) (citing Balt. & Phila. Steamboat Co. v. Norton, 284 U.S. 408, 414 
(1932)).  But see Fitzhugh, supra note 12 (stating that the Voris presumption was abrogated by Dir., 
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994), which looked 
to the “plain language” of the LHWCA (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 17. See Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(rejecting the differing Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit situs tests, and relying on its own precedent, 
the plain language of the LHWCA, and the intent of Congress to find against the claimant).  Other 
circuits have struggled to interpret this requirement, but the circuit decisions this Comment analyzes 
set forth the clearest and earliest tests for the situs requirement.  See, e.g., Cunningham v. Dir., 
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 377 F.3d 98, 104 (1st Cir. 2004) (“This court has not yet 
articulated a standard methodology for approaching the questions of ‘adjoining area.’. . . 
[H]owever, other circuits have adopted varied approaches.”); Scott v. Trump Indiana, Inc., 337 
F.3d 939, 946 (7th Cir. 2003) (using Supreme Court cases, not other Seventh Circuit precedent, to 
find against a claimant); Stowers v. Consol. Rail Corp., 985 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir. 1993) (agreeing 
primarily with the Third Circuit’s interpretation of maritime employment in its decision). 
 18. 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 19. See id. at 638. 
Congress was cautious in its language [in the LHWCA], but the fact remains that 
[Congress] intended to expand the scope of the LHWCA to provide a federal workmen’s 
compensation remedy for all maritime employees.  We believe that Congress has 
exercised in full its legislative jurisdiction in admiralty.  As long as the employment 
nexus (status) with maritime activity is maintained, the federal compensation remedy 
should be available. 
Id. 
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recognized that its “broad interpretation of the maritime situs requirement” 
would not create a bright line rule, but would, instead, allow decisions to be 
made on a case-by-case basis.20  Meanwhile, in Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. 
v. Herron, the Ninth Circuit enumerated the “functional relationship” test, which 
employed four factors to determine if a claim satisfied the situs requirement.21  
The Fifth Circuit did not adopt a uniform test appropriate for application across 
all cases.22 
In one of the more recent cases out of the Fifth Circuit, New Orleans Depot 
Services, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker’s Compensation Programs,23 the 
court overturned its own precedent and interpreted narrowly the LHWCA’s situs 
requirement. 24  Similar to the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation in New Orleans 
Depot Services, the Fourth Circuit also interpreted narrowly the LHWCA’s situs 
requirement in Sidwell v. Express Container Services, Inc.25  Great inequity 
results from these divergent interpretations.26 
The conflicting judicial analyses of the situs requirement and the inequity they 
cause are the primary reasons the interpretations of the LHWCA’s status and 
situs requirements must be harmonized.  For the sake of equity and 
predictability, the Supreme Court should resolve the circuit split over the 
 20. Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 516 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), 
overruled by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 718 
F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 21. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 141 (9th Cir. 1978) (providing a 
non-exhaustive list of the factors a court should consider in deciding whether an area is an 
“adjoining area” including: “the particular suitability of the site for the maritime uses referred to in 
the statute; whether adjoining properties are devoted primarily to uses in maritime commerce; the 
proximity of the site to the waterway; and whether the site is as close to the waterway as is feasible 
given all of the circumstances”). 
 22. Winchester, 632 F.2d at 518–19 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting); see also Humphries v. Dir., 
Office of Workers Comp. Programs, 834 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir. 1987) (criticizing the Winchester 
decision as proffering “little more than a litany of factors” and, ultimately, being inconclusive in 
determining the situs requirement). 
 23. 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 24. Id. at 394–95 (concluding, “[w]e, therefore, overrule the contrary definition and analysis 
of [the situs requirement in] Winchester and its progeny inconsistent with this  
opinion . . . . [W]e are also influenced by the fact that the vague definition of “adjoining” we adopted 
thirty years ago in Winchester provides litigants and courts . . . with little guidance in determining 
whether coverage is provided by the Act.”). 
 25. 71 F.3d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1995).  In Sidwell, the Fourth Circuit rejected the 
“expansive” and “broad[]” approaches of the courts in Winchester and Sea-Land.  See id. at 1137–
38.  The court, instead, ruled that the “covered situses actually ‘adjoin’ navigable waters.”  Id. at 
1138.  Additionally, the court noted that, in interpreting statutes, circuit courts will defer to the 
intent of Congress when that intent is clear, and, in the terms of the LHWCA, that Supreme Court 
Justice Kennedy has stated that Congress provided clear intent in drafting the LHWCA.  Id. (citing 
Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 484 (1992)). 
 26. See Fitzhugh, supra note 12 (“There is now a very serious split among the circuits on what 
‘adjoining’ means and just how far landward coverage extends and what boundaries limit it. . . . 
[S]ubstantially different outcomes will result depending on the state in which the injury occurred.”). 
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interpretation of the LHWCA’s situs requirement.  This Comment suggests that 
the Supreme Court should create a bright line rule extending the LHWCA’s situs 
requirement to an area enclosed within a seaport terminal or extending outward 
one thousand feet from any boundary between navigable water and land, 
whichever distance is greater.27 
This Comment begins by analyzing the Jensen Doctrine and its interpretation 
of the judicial landscape of workers’ compensation coverage prior to the 1927 
enactment of the LHWCA.  This Comment then examines the original language 
of the LHWCA and the deficiencies of the original Act. Next, this Comment 
discusses how Congress sought to ameliorate the deficiencies of the original Act 
with an amended LHWCA in 1972.  Thereafter, this Comment identifies 
Congress’ intent regarding the scope of compensation coverage provided by the 
amended Act and analyzes the initial jurisprudence of the amended Act.  This 
Comment reviews five opinions from the United States Courts of Appeals, 
which illustrate the fractured nature of the circuit courts’ intepretations of the 
situs requirement of the 1972 LHWCA.  This Comment concludes that the 
interpretation of the LHWCA’s situs requirement is ripe for adjudication by the 
Supreme Court because the narrow interpretation of the situs requirement—
which is the trending interpretation among circuit courts—is inequitable and 
deprives a large number of maritime workers compensation coverage. 
I.  THE IMPETUS FOR THE 1927 LONGSHOREMEN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION ACT AND ITS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
A.  The Jensen Doctrine Prohibits State Compensation Laws from Protecting 
Maritime Workers, but No Federal Law Offers the Necessary Protection 
In the 1917 case Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,28 the Supreme Court ruled 
that, because the U.S. Constitution grants jurisdiction over admiralty and 
maritime law to the U.S. Congress, states are prohibited from granting maritime 
workers compensation coverage under state compensation laws if death or injury 
to the worker occurred on the waterside boundary between the state’s land and 
the sea.29  As a result of Jensen, a state workers’ compensation law could cover 
a worker injured on a dock, but not a worker similarly injured on a ship moments 
after it left the dock.30 
In 1927, Congress drafted the original LHWCA in response to Jensen, seeking 
to correct the inequity of the Jensen Doctrine and to assuage the fears of 
maritime workers affected by the inequity.31  Specifically, Congress intended 
 27. For an example of the dangers of an imprecise test for the situs requirement, see id. at 4. 
 28. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
 29. Id. at 214–18.  See also Merlin, supra note 6 at 148. 
 30. See Merlin, supra note 6, at 148 (discussing the effects of the Jensen decision on state 
workers’ compensation laws). 
 31. Id. at 148.  Prior to the enactment of the LHWCA in 1927, Congress attempted to grant 
states the power to compensate maritime workers, but the Supreme Court struck down each attempt 
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the LHWCA to provide compensation for injury to or death of maritime 
workers. 32   Initially, coverage of the 1927 LHWCA applied to “injur[ies] 
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States” and to workers 
employed on dry docks.33  Coverage under the original LHWCA was tailored 
specifically to include claims that the Jensen Doctrine excluded from a state’s 
jurisdiction. 34  The 1927 LHWCA, however, was not the all-encompassing 
legislation the maritime industry required; it explicitly denied coverage to a 
select group of maritime workers.35 
B.  The 1927 LHWCA Created An Unintentional No Man’s Land for Maritime 
Workers 
Through the original LHWCA, Congress abrogated the Jensen Doctrine and 
provided compensation coverage to maritime workers injured or killed on the 
seaward side of a state’s navigable water boundary. 36   A troubling void, 
however, developed in the years following enactment of the LHWCA. 37   
Although Congress intended to extend coverage of state workers’ compensation 
laws to maritime workers injured “upon the navigable waters of the United 
States,”38 rigid judicial interpretation of the original LHWCA led to the denial 
of coverage for a class of workers under both federal and state compensation 
acts. 39  Specifically, workers who sustained injury or died on the gangway 
between a vessel and the dock were not covered under the original LHWCA.40 
as unconstitutional.  See id. at 148 n.9 (citing Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 
(1924); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Steward, 253 U.S. 149 (1920)). 
 32. See Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), ch. 509, § 3(a), 
44 Stat. 1424, 1426 (1927) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (2012)) (describing the 
coverage of the LHWCA). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 632–33 
(3d Cir. 1976); see also Merlin, supra note 6, at 148–49. 
 35. § (3)(a)(1)–(2), 44 Stat. at 1426  (denying compensation to any captain, any crew, or any 
other person engaged in stevedoring operations for any vessel weighing less than eighteen net tons, 
any employee or agent of the United States’ government, and any person whose injury was a result 
of his own drunkenness or intentional injury). 
 36. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text. 
 37. Merlin, supra note 6, at 150 (clarifying the implications of the courts’ interpretation of 
the original language of the LHWCA). 
 38. § 3(a), 44 Stat. at 1426 (stating, in the coverage section of the statute, that an “injury 
occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States” is a compensable act); see also Merlin, 
supra note 6, at 148. 
 39. See P.C. Pfeiffer Co. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 72–73, 73 n.2 (1979) (noting that the language 
of the original LHWCA, coupled with the Court’s decision in Jensen, led to a “situs test [that] was 
understood to draw a sharp line between injuries sustained over water and those suffered on land,” 
and the impact this line of interpretation had on compensation coverage decisions in the lower 
courts). 
 40. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 632–
33 (3d Cir. 1976) (according to the court, under the original language of the LHWCA, there was a 
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C.  The 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA Sought to Provide More Complete 
Coverage to Maritime Workers 
Realizing the gulf remaining between the intentions of the original LHWCA 
and the judicial interpretations of the Act, Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting 
opinion in the 1969 case Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson41 that suggested 
Congress move the demarcating line created by the original LHWCA closer to 
land.42 
In 1972, Congress amended the LHWCA.43  Congress only intended the 1972 
Amendments to be “modest in scope.”44  Congress did not want any notice 
provisions to be a barrier for employee coverage under the LHWCA, so 
Congress attempted to maintain an uneasy balance between preventing barriers 
to compensation coverage and not increasing the scope of the Act. 45   
Consequently, Congress included an additional prong—the situs prong—to the 
coverage requirement of the LHWCA. 46    Courts still use the two-prong 
approach to determine a longshoreman’s or harbor worker’s coverage under the 
“continuing anomaly that the schedule of benefits [under the LHWCA] to be applied in any case 
depended on whether the injury occurred on the land or water side of the gangplank”). 
 41. 396 U.S. 212 (1969) (reversing a Fourth Circuit en banc ruling and holding that an injury 
occurring on a pier, which is attached permanently to land and extends seaward, is not covered 
under the original LHWCA). 
 42. See id. at 224–25 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the lower court’s statement that 
only Congress could alter the LHWCA’s coverage). 
 43. Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
92-576, 86 Stat. 1251. 
 44. S. SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUB. WELFARE, 92D CONG., 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LONGSHOREMEN’S AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION ACT 
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 157 (Comm. Print 1972). 
 45. See id. 
 46. See § 2(3), 86 Stat. at 1251.  Later, Congress refined the status requirement to cover more 
accurately workers who Congress first envisioned fell under the purview of the LHWCA. See 33 
U.S.C. § 902(3)(A)–(H) (2012) (adding a provision allowing coverage of stevedoring employees 
as long as they are not covered by a state compensation statute, and listing specifically those types 
of employees who are not covered under the amended LHWCA, including: “(A) individuals 
employed exclusively to perform office clerical, secretarial, security, or data processing work; (B) 
individuals employed by a club, camp, recreational operation . . . ; (C) individuals employed by a 
marina [in a capacity other than maritime construction] . . . ; (D) individuals who . . . are temporarily 
doing business on the premises of an employer [as defined in the statute] . . . ; (E) aquaculture 
workers; (F) individuals employed to build any recreational vessel under sixty-five feet in length . 
. . ; (G) a master or member of a crew of any vessel; or (H) any person engaged by a master to load 
or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net . . .”). 
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LHWCA.47  Unfortunately, confounded by Congress’ intent in the LHWCA, 
many courts struggle to interpret the two-pronged approach.48 
II.  THE COURTS OF APPEALS EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE SITUS REQUIREMENT 
BETWEEN 1976 AND 1994 
A.  The Third Circuit Erased the Situs Requirement of the LHWCA in Sea-Land 
Service 
In the 1976 case Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’ 
Compensation Programs,49 the Third Circuit held that the LHWCA covered a 
worker who was injured when his truck overturned on a public street inside a 
shipping terminal complex. 50   Wallace Johns was employed by Sea-Land 
Service, Inc. to transport maritime cargo through a shipping terminal located in 
Port Elizabeth, New Jersey.51  While transporting his cargo on a public road 
inside the terminal zone of the port, Johns’ truck overturned, injuring him.52  
Fencing enclosed the shipping terminal, and the nearest navigable water was 
more than one-half mile from the site of the accident.53 
Initially, Johns filed a claim against his employer under the state 
compensation laws.54  For almost three months, Sea-Land paid the claim at the 
state compensation level.55  Johns filed a new claim under the LHWCA in July 
1973 to take advantage of more generous federal benefits.56  Sea-Land opposed 
paying the larger claims amount provided for by the federal law. 57   The 
administrative law judge (ALJ) denied the larger federal benefits, holding that 
Johns was not injured within the purview of the situs requirement of the 
 47. See New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 718 
F.3d 384, 387–89, 393 (5th Cir. 2013) (showing how several courts have wrestled with the 
application of the status and situs requirements of the LHWCA). 
 48. See id.; see also Hayes v. CSX Transp., Inc., 985 F.2d 137, 139–42 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(discussing the courts’ struggles to interpret uniformly the LHWCA’s situs and status 
requirements). 
 49. 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 50. Id. at 639. 
 51. Id. at 631–32 (stating that Johns was not a regular, full-time employee of Sea-Land 
Services, but was more like a part-time worker, “a ‘shape-up’ employee,” employed through a 
commission that hired people on a fill-in basis). 
 52. Id. at 632. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (noting that there were several workers’ compensation statutes that Johns may have 
utilized—the LHWCA, the New Jersey Workmen’s Compensation Act, and the Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act—but that each statute required an initial adjudication of the status of the 
injured worker). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  Sea-Land insisted it did not need to pay Johns’ larger claim because “at the time of 
the injury, the claimant was covered by the New Jersey statute, not the federal statute.”  Id. 
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LHWCA.58  On appeal, the Benefits Review Board (BRB) reversed the ALJ, 
finding that Johns was engaged in activity within the LHWCA’s situs 
requirement.59  Sea-Land appealed the BRB’s decision to the Third Circuit.60 
The Third Circuit determined that Johns was an “employee” and that Sea-
Land Service was an “employer” as defined in the LHWCA.61  Turning to the 
coverage requirements of the LHWCA, the court found that the injured 
employee clearly satisfied the status requirement and remanded the case to the 
BRB to determine if the claim met the situs requirement.62  The Third Circuit 
offered the BRB guidance on interpreting the requirement because the court did 
not believe that the BRB understood the proper scope of the amended 
LHWCA. 63   Noting that the Supreme Court held previously that no state 
compensation laws could infringe on the constitutionally-protected power of 
Congress to regulate exclusively the navigable waters of the United States, the 
Third Circuit concluded that the power of Congress to regulate compensation 
laws could extend only as far as Congress’ admiralty jurisdiction allowed.64  The 
Third Circuit also stated that Congress intended the 1972 Amendments to the 
LHWCA to provide a constant cloak of compensation protection to maritime 
workers.65  Congress sought to avoid maritime workers inadvertently “walk[ing] 
 58. Id. at 631. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 634 (“[T]he ‘coverage’ provision and the ‘employer’ definition [in the LHWCA] 
manifest an unmistakable congressional intention to afford federal coverage for injuries occurring 
in areas inland of the navigable waters of the United States where, prior to 1972, Congress had 
deferred to state law.”). 
 62. Id. at 640. 
 63. See id. at 634 (noting that determining the scope of the situs requirement was “of no little 
difficulty as several diverging opinions demonstrate”).  The court specifically questioned the 
BRB’s interpretation of the 1972 amendments’ scope.  Id. at 634.  The Third Circuit also noted that 
critical factual determinations were not addressed sufficiently in the lower courts.  See id. at 632.  
The ALJ and BRB both failed to produce findings of “the contents of the crate that Johns was 
hauling at the time of the accident, its origins, or its destination,” and to “make any finding as to 
whether a vessel was berthed at or expected” where Johns was working.  Id.  These facts, the Third 
Circuit expressed, may have been essential to adjudicating the claim.  Id.  Therefore, the court held 
that “[b]ecause of the inadequacy of the record compiled in the administrative proceedings, we are 
not in position to either approve or disapprove the Board’s decision and must remand for additional 
fact-finding.”  Id. at 634. 
 64. Id. at 635 (citing State Indus. Comm’n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263 (1922); Victory 
Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 210 (1971)) (“[T]he Constitution forbids state compensation 
laws to intrude on the navigable waters of the United States. On those waters the federal lawmaking 
power is exclusive, but the scope of congressional power to enact federal compensation legislation 
pursuant to its admiralty jurisdiction is, of course, defined by the test of navigability.”). 
 65. Id. at 636–37 (writing that the chief reason for Congress amending the LHWCA in 1972 
was to broaden the coverage of the Act to those areas that used to be under the purview of the state 
compensation laws). 
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into federal coverage and out of state coverage, and vice versa” while performing 
daily maritime activities.66 
B.  The Ninth Circuit Employs a Four-Factor Test to Determine the 
Satisfaction of the Situs Requirement in Brady-Hamilton 
In Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron,67 the Ninth Circuit interpreted 
the LHWCA’s situs requirement broadly. 68   Brady-Hamilton hired James 
Herron as a gear lockman to repair, maintain, and inspect equipment that the 
company used around the pier.69  Herron often transported equipment from the 
company’s storage facility to the pier, which was located approximately one-
half mile away.70  Herron was injured while moving steel plates from his truck 
to a storage facility.71  Subsequently, Herron filed a compensation claim under 
the amended LHWCA.72  His employer disputed the claim on the ground that 
Herron’s injury was not covered by the Act.73 
Brady-Hamilton argued that Herron’s injuries did not satisfy the status 
requirement of the Act because the steel plates he unloaded from the truck were 
not intended for maritime use. The ALJ did not agree.74  It determined that the 
steel plates were intended for maritime use75  The ALJ, therefore, ruled that 
Herron met both the status and situs requirements of the LHWCA. 76  The 
company appealed the decision to the BRB, and the BRB affirmed the ALJ’s 
ruling.77  Brady-Hamilton appealed the BRB ruling to the Ninth Circuit.78 
The Ninth Circuit approached the case in the same manner the Third Circuit 
approached Sea-Land Service.  First, the Ninth Circuit inspected the language of 
33 U.S.C. §§ 902(3) and 903(a), finding both a status and a situs requirement 
inherent in the LHWCA, but the court declined to overturn the ALJ’s findings.79  
The Ninth Circuit held that Herron met the status requirement because he was 
an employee as defined under section 902(3) of the LHWCA.80  Turning to the 
Act’s situs requirement, the Ninth Circuit rested its reasoning on the Supreme 
 66. Id. at 637. 
 67. 568 F.2d 137 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 68. Id. 140–41. 
 69. Id. at 139. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. (“The administrative law judge found that these [steel] plates were to be installed on a 
vessel in such a way that logs loaded on the vessel could be securely fastened to the plates.”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 140. 
 75. Id. at 139–40. 
 76. See id. at 139 (“The [ALJ] held that the [LHWCA] . . . cover[ed] Herron’s injury and 
awarded compensation.”). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 139–40. 
 80. Id. at 140. 
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Court’s decision in Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo,81 finding that 
Herron’s injury was covered under the situs requirement of the LHWCA.82  In 
making this determination, the Ninth Circuit created the “functional 
relationship” test, which it used to determine if the situs of a maritime accident 
adjoined the navigable waters by analyzing: 
[1] the particular suitability of the site for the maritime uses referred 
to in the statute; [2] whether adjoining properties are devoted primarily 
to uses in maritime commerce; [3] the proximity of the site to the 
waterway; and [4] whether the site is as close to the waterway as is 
feasible given all of the circumstances in the case.”83 
This four-factor functional relationship test continued the broad interpretation of 
the situs requirement also evidenced in Sea-Land Service. 
C.  The Fifth Circuit Incorporates the Views of Brady-Hamilton and Sea-Land 
Service 
The Fifth Circuit interpreted the LHWCA’s situs requirement broadly 
in Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester.84  Specifically, the Winchester court 
concluded that the situs requirement of the LHWCA covered an injury occurring 
in a gear building several blocks from the gate of the maritime terminal.85 
Murl Winchester was a gear repairman assigned to work in three storage 
equipment buildings inside the Houston Shipping Channel Docks for Texports 
Stevedore Co.86  Winchester fell into a forklift in one of the buildings located 
five blocks away from the nearest shipping terminal access gate.87 
Following his injury, Winchester filed a compensation claim under the 
LHWCA.88  Although the ALJ denied the disfigurement claim, the judge held 
 81. 432 U.S. 249 (1977) (holding that Congress, in amending the LHWCA, sought to provide 
more protection to maritime workers whose work had gradually been moving inland, though was 
still heavily maritime in nature). 
 82. Brady-Hamilton, 568 F.2d at 140–41.  “While [Caputo] is not dispositive of the situs 
question, the approach of the Court in interpreting the [LHWCA] is instructive.”  Id. at 140.  
Specifically, in Caputo, “[t]he Court found that the 1972 Amendments were motivated by two 
congressional purposes: (1) to recognize that modern cargo handling techniques have moved much 
of a longshoreman’s work onto land, and (2) to provide continuous coverage to workers who would 
otherwise be covered for only part of their activities.”  Id. at 140–41 (citing Caputo, 432 U.S. at 
249). 
 83. Id. at 141 (intending, by inclusion of the phrase “among others,” that the four factors put 
forth by the Court were not to be an all-encompassing list upon which future courts should rely 
strictly). 
 84. 632 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), overruled by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. 
Dir. Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 384, 394 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 85. Id. at 513–15. 
 86. Id. at 506–07 (stating that the third gear room, where the longshoreman was injured, was 
not at the docks, but was “as close as Texports could get to the docks”). 
 87. Id. at 507 (noting that Winchester suffered “serious facial disfigurement” when he fell 
into the forklift). 
 88. Id. 
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Texports Stevedore liable for Winchester’s injuries.89  The company appealed 
this ruling to the BRB.90  The BRB affirmed the holding of the ALJ.91  Like the 
broad Third Circuit ruling in Sea-Land Service, the BRB’s interpretation of the 
situs requirement focused on the utility of the general location as a maritime 
area, rather than on the geographic location of the accident.92  Texports appealed 
the BRB decision to the Fifth Circuit.93  On appeal, a Fifth Circuit panel upheld 
the ALJ decision, citing the policies of broad construction of statutory language, 
a presumption that the LHWCA was meant to cover maritime employees, and 
the limited scope of judicial review by the panel over findings of fact by the 
ALJ.94  Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit granted a petition for rehearing en banc.95 
The en banc court analyzed both the policy behind the amended LHWCA and 
the Fifth Circuit’s own broad interpretation of the situs requirement.96  The court 
eschewed a narrow reading of the LHWCA coverage requirements, reasoning 
that an “adjoining area” under the situs requirement of the amended Act was 
subject to a totality of the circumstances assessment.97 
III.  TWO COURTS OF APPEALS CHANGE COURSE AND BEGIN INTERPRETING 
THE LHWCA’S SITUS REQUIREMENT NARROWLY 
A.  The Fourth Circuit Disfavors the Aforementioned Broad Tests of the Situs 
Requirement 
In 1995, the Fourth Circuit, in Sidwell v. Express Container Services, Inc.,98 
held that the situs requirement of the LHWCA did not cover a worker who was 
injured more than one-half mile from a port terminal.99  The Fourth Circuit 
focused primarily on the breadth of the situs requirement encompassing 
maritime workers.100 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 507–08 (discussing the BRB’s fact and legal findings). 
 93. Id. at 508. 
 94. Id. (refusing to adopt Texports Stevedore’s position, and holding that “[a]lthough we 
recognize the merit of some of petitioners’ positions, we decline their invitation to constrict the 
broadened coverage of the LHWCA by corseting the areas eligible as maritime situses”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 508–13. 
 97. Id. at 513–14 (“The best way to effectuate the congressional purposes is to determine the 
situs question by looking at all the circumstances.  The situs requirement compels a factual 
determination that cannot be hedged by the labels placed on an area. . . . Growing ports are not 
hemmed in by fence lines; [the LHWCA’s] coverage should not be either. All circumstances must 
be examined.”). 
 98. 71 F.3d 1134 (5th Cir. 1995). 
 99. Id. at 1135, 1142. 
 100. Id. at 1135. 
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Express Container’s operations took place in a building eight-tenths of one 
mile from the Portsmouth Maritime Terminal. 101   Most of the company’s 
business was unrelated to maritime activity.102  There were instances, however, 
when employees of Express Container Services would work on maritime 
projects either in the company facility or on a pier.103  At the time of the accident, 
Christopher Sidwell was working at the container facility near the terminal 
gates.104 
Relying on the “functional relationship” test established by the Ninth Circuit 
in Brady-Hamilton, the ALJ denied Sidwell’s compensation claim under the 
LHWCA, and the BRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision.105  Ultimately, the Fourth 
Circuit upheld the denial of the initial claim, and, while doing so, systematically 
refuted each of the three broad tests from Sea-Land Service, Brady-Hamilton, 
and Winchester.106 
Prior to Sidwell, the Fourth Circuit twice discussed the situs requirement of 
the LHWCA.107  In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Graham,108 
the Fourth Circuit held that the locations in question, which were “integral parts 
of the shipyard,” were covered under the situs requirement.109  Additionally, 
in Humphries v. Director, Office of Workers Compensation Programs,110 the 
Fourth Circuit held that the situs requirement of the LHWCA was not met when 
a maritime worker was hit by a car one and one-half miles from the 
port.111  Sidwell was, therefore, positioned to determine the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation of the situs requirement.112 
First, the Sidwell court accepted the Fourth Circuit’s previous rejection of the 
Third Circuit’s reasoning in Sea-Land Service, stating that the Third Circuit’s 
interpretation essentially gutted the LHWCA of its situs requirement.113  The 
 101. Id. at 1135. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (finding that the petitioner had not worked at the terminal for one year prior to working 
at the new container facility). 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 1135–37 (discussing the various tests previously employed by the Fourth 
Circuit’s sister circuits). 
 107. Id. at 1137. 
 108. 573 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1978). 
 109. Id. at 169. 
 110. 834 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 111. Id. at 373–74. 
 112. Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1137 (stating that the court was deciding Sidwell with the guidance of 
the Fourth Circuit’s previous LHWCA decisions). 
 113. Id. at 1137 (stating that, in Humphries, the Fourth Circuit “rejected Sea-Land as 
‘unacceptable’ because it ‘effectively read[] the explicit situs requirement out of the [LHWCA]’” 
(quoting Humphries, 834 F.2d at 374)).  Additionally, the Sidwell court noted that the Supreme 
Court “explained . . . the requirements of ‘status’ and ‘situs’ are distinct, and that neither should be 
read to render the other superfluous.”  Id. at 1136 (citing Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 
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Fourth Circuit also noted its prior ruling that, while the four-factor test 
from Brady-Hamilton was a valid attempt at “a more practical approach” than 
the test proffered in Sea-Land Service, the Ninth Circuit’s test still failed in its 
interpretation of Congress’ true intent in amending the LHWCA.114  Lastly, 
the Sidwell court stated that the Fifth Circuit’s Winchester case elucidated little 
more than a string of factors that were inconclusive in their totality.115 
B.  The Fifth Circuit Reverses Its Holding in Winchester, Relying Heavily on 
the Divergent Sidwell Decision 
In one of the most recent cases interpreting the LHWCA’s situs requirement, 
the Fifth Circuit reversed its broad interpretation of the situs requirement 
from Winchester.116  In the 2013 case, New Orleans Depot Services, Inc. v. 
Director, Office of Worker’s Compensation Programs,117 the Fifth Circuit held 
that the LHWCA did not cover a maritime worker who suffered hearing loss at 
a maritime facility.118 
Juan Zepeda worked in a “small industrial park” about 300 yards from the 
nearest navigable waters.119  He repaired and maintained marine containers used 
for transporting seafaring cargo. 120   Following an injury, Zepeda filed an 
LHWCA claim against two prior employers. 121   Both employers sought 
clarification from the ALJ as to which employer was accountable for paying 
Zepeda’s workers’ compensation benefits. 122   The ALJ determined that, if 
Zepeda was entitled to coverage under the LHWCA, New Orleans Depot 
414, 426 (1985); Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. Perini North River Assocs., 459 U.S. 
297, 324 n.32 (1983)). 
 114. Id. at 1136–37 (quoting Humphries, 834 F.2d at 374) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(discussing the Fourth Circuit’s prior treatment of its sister circuits’ analyses of the LHWCA’s situs 
requirement). 
 115. Id. at 1137. 
 116. New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 
384, 393–94 (5th Cir. 2013) (choosing to adopt a narrow interpretation of the situs requirement of 
the LHWCA, instead of the precedent in Winchester). 
 117. 718 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 118. See id. at 386 (vacating the BRB’s decision awarding benefits to the maritime worker). 
 119. Id. at 386–87 (listing the types of businesses around the “small industrial park,” to note 
that the New Orleans Depot employees did not have access to the Intracoastal Canal, which was 
300 yards away). 
 120. Id. at 387.  The type of work in which Zepeda was engaged satisfied the LHWCA’s status 
requirement.  Id. 
 121. Id. at 386.  In resolving the issue of which employer, if either, was responsible for the 
workers’ compensation claim of Zepeda, the Fifth Circuit relied upon a secondary source that 
stated: “[w]hen the disability arises from an ‘occupational injury’ incurred while working for 
different employers, the last employer who exposes the claimant to the injury-causing condition 
may be responsible for all of the benefits.”  Id. at 386 n.2 (quoting FRANK L. MARAIST ET AL., 
ADMIRALTY IN A NUTSHELL 291 (6th ed. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 122. Id. 
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Services was the correct company to pay the benefits.123  The ALJ determined 
that Zepeda met both the status and situs requirements of the LHWCA.124  On 
appeal, the BRB affirmed the lower court’s ruling.125  New Orleans Depot 
appealed the BRB decision to the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the initial 
decision, before voting to hear the case en banc.126 
Sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit discussed its prior decision in Winchester.127  
The court noted that its precedent eschewed a bright line rule in favor of a totality 
of the circumstances approach.128  The court, however, lamented that Winchester 
failed to discuss exactly which circumstances should be considered in this 
approach.129 
Following the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Sidwell, the Fifth Circuit reviewed 
its sister circuits’ interpretations of the situs requirement of the LHWCA.130  
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit chose not to follow the Third and Ninth Circuits’ 
decisions in Sea-Land Service and Brady-Hamilton, respectively.131  Instead, 
believing that Sidwell was more faithful to the text of the amended LHWCA, the 
Fifth Circuit adopted the narrow “Sidwell definition of ‘adjoining’ navigable 
 123. Id. at 387. 
 124. Id.  “Also, the ALJ found that the repair work and maintenance Mr. Zepeda performed on 
these containers was related closely to loading or unloading vessels and constituted ‘maritime 
employment,’ which satisfied the status test under the Act.”  Id.  “In addition, the ALJ concluded 
that the location of the [New Orleans Depot] Chef Yard, located some 300 yards from the 
Intracoastal Canal[,] satisfied the situs requirement that the injury occur in an area ‘adjoining 
navigable waters.’”  Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 386–87 (explaining that a Fifth Circuit panel originally “affirmed the BRB[‘s]” 
decision that found Zepeda was covered by the LHWCA, but the Fifth Circuit decided to reexamine 
the case en banc to discuss specifically the breadth of the LHWCA’s situs test). 
 127. Id. at 389–90 (stating that Winchester, decided in 1980, was the Fifth Circuit’s first 
opportunity to define the situs requirement). 
 128. Id. at 390 (quoting Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 
1980) (en banc), overruled by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. 
Programs, 718 F.3d, 394 (5th Cir. 2013)). 
 129. Id. The court noted: 
 
Other than these vague instructions [that all circumstances should be considered in 
determining if the situs requirement was met], the [Winchester] court provided little 
guidance to other courts or future litigants on how to determine from “the circumstances” 
whether a claimant satisfies the situs test.  This is apparent from the court’s statement: 
“[O]uter limits of the maritime area will not be extended to extremes.  We would not 
extend coverage in this case to downtown Houston.  The site must have some nexus with 
the waterfront.” 
Id. (quoting Winchester, 632 F.2d at 514). 
 130. See id. at 390–91 (analyzing some of the other circuits’ jurisprudence regarding the 
LHWCA). 
 131. Id. (reasoning that the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation “adhere[d] more faithfully to the 
plain language of the statute” than the other circuits). 
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water[s],” overturning its prior broad interpretation of the LHWCA’s situs 
requirement.132 
IV.  ANALYZING THE INTERPRETATIONS OF EACH CIRCUIT REGARDING THE 
1972 AMENDMENTS TO THE LHWCA 
A.  Taking a Broad Tack: Analyzing How Courts Expanded the Situs 
Requirement 
In Sea-Land Service, the Third Circuit believed Congress intended the 1972 
Amendments to cover maritime workers even when the workers walked inside 
and outside of areas covered by the original LHWCA. 133   With this 
congressional purpose firmly in mind, the Third Circuit interpreted the coverage 
of the amended LHWCA in a sweeping manner.134  The court held that as long 
as the status requirement of the LHWCA was met, the Act should cover the 
maritime worker.135  The Third Circuit’s holding effectively removed the situs 
requirement from the LHWCA.136  According to the court, Congress intended 
the LHWCA to be a federal compensation act for every maritime worker.137  
Consequently, the court construed the situs requirement as being applicable to 
the location of vessels engaged in maritime commerce, rather than the situs of 
the worker’s injury or death.138 
The Ninth Circuit likewise interpreted the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA 
broadly.  In Brady-Hamilton, the Ninth Circuit stated that the “adjoining area” 
language in the act included even those areas not physically congruent to 
navigable waters.139  Applying its “functional relationship” test,140 the Ninth 
Circuit found that the equipment serviced by the injured employee was exclusive 
to maritime activity, and the building that housed the equipment was “integral” 
 132. Id. at 393–94 (defining “adjoining” as “border[ing] on” or “be[ing] contiguous with,” thus 
requiring direct, physical connection between the area of injury and navigable water). 
 133. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 637 (3d 
Cir. 1976). 
 134. See id. at 638; see also Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1136 (4th 
Cir. 1995) (stating that the Supreme Court described the Third Circuit’s ruling as “appearing to 
‘essentially discard[] the situs test’” (alteration in the original) (quoting Ne. Marine Terminal Co. 
v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 277 n.40 (1977))). 
 135. Sea-Land Serv., 540 F.2d at 638. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Brady-Hamilton Stevedore Co. v. Herron, 568 F.2d 137, 141 (9th Cir. 1978) (relying on 
the overall intent of the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA and holding that a rigid reading of the 
phrase “adjoining area” was inconsistent with this intent). 
 140. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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to the company’s maritime activity, and, therefore, the ALJ was correct in 
determining that the building was as close to the pier as feasible.141 
In Winchester, the Fifth Circuit noted that the inequitable Jensen Doctrine led 
Congress to pass the original LHWCA in 1927.142  The court also discussed the 
rigid interpretation of the original LHWCA by the Supreme Court in Nacirema, 
as well as the 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA.143  The Winchester court urged 
a broader reading of the LHWCA coverage requirements, partially because 
technological advances had moved a significant amount of maritime work 
inward from the edges of the navigable waters.144  Unlike the court in Sea-Land 
Service, which collapsed the LHWCA’s status and situs requirements into one 
status-focused requirement, 145  the Winchester court sided with the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis in Brady-Hamilton and read the Act as providing for 
application of two separate requirements.146 
The Winchester court noted that it should interpret the situs requirement 
broadly because the Supreme Court, in Caputo, indicated that the 1972 
Amendments were meant to be “expansive.”147  The Winchester court also relied 
on its own precedent in Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co. v. Kininess,148 
where the court eschewed rigid compliance with the LHWCA’s language in 
favor of compliance with the broad policies of the amended Act.149  Notably, 
in Winchester, the Fifth Circuit stated that because the “[g]rowing ports are not 
 141. Brady-Hamilton, 568 F.2d at 141 (echoing the concerns of the BRB, which said that there 
was only so much land that abuts the navigable water on which maritime facilities can be built, and 
that, as the shipping industry expands its terrestrial footprint, the coverage of the LHWCA should 
likewise expand). 
 142. Texports Stevedore Co. v. Winchester, 632 F.2d 504, 508–09 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), 
overruled by New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 718 
F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214–18 (1917)). 
 143. Id. at 509–10 (citing Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 223–24 (1969)). 
 144. See id.  at 510 (citing Ne. Marine Terminal, Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977)).  
The Court, in Caputo, stated that “[o]ne of the primary motivations for Congress’ decision to extend 
the coverage shoreward was the recognition that ‘the advent of modern cargo-handling techniques’ 
had moved much of the longshoremen’s work off the vessel and onto land.”  Caputo, 432 U.S. at 
269–70 (citing S. REP. NO. 92–1125, at 13 (1972); H.R. REP. NO. 92-1441, at 10 (1972)). 
 145. See Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 638–
39 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding that “coverage under the [LHWCA] is not foreclosed by the fact that the 
accident occurred on a public street in the marine terminal not under the employer’s control”). 
 146. Winchester, 632 F.2d at 510 (reading the status and situs prongs of the LHWCA as 
expanding the coverage of the LHWCA, the court recognized that some semblance of maritime 
activity still had to occur for the LHWCA to apply); see also Brady-Hamilton, 568 F.2d at 139–40 
(“Situs and status must coincide before coverage will attach.  Each test acts as a control upon the 
other so as to diminish the potential for undue expansion of coverage.”). 
 147. Winchester, 632 F.2d at 510 (quoting Caputo, 432 U.S. at 268) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 148. 554 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 149. Winchester, 632 F.2d at 512 (“In any event, the physical distance is not decisive . . . . The 
test is whether the situs is within a contiguous shipbuilding area which adjoins the water.” (quoting 
Ala. Dry Dock, 554 F.2d at 178) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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hemmed in by fence lines; the [LHWCA’s] coverage should not be either.”150  
As such, the Fifth Circuit declined to create a bright line rule that would 
encompass all activities that could fall within the LHWCA’s coverage 
requirements.151  Realizing such an unencumbered view of the situs requirement 
may be scrutinized, the Fifth Circuit made sure to iterate that its current view of 
the situs requirement would “not be extended to extremes,” and must have some 
discernable relationship to the waterways.152 
Finally, the Winchester court stated that, absent clear policy decisions and 
court precedent, it was compelled to define the LHWCA’s situs requirement 
broadly. 153   The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the word “adjoining,” in the 
LHWCA, had many broad synonyms and, even if strict congruity with the words 
was required, the word “area” in the phrase “adjoining area” demanded the situs 
requirement be interpreted broadly.154  In holding that Texports Stevedore was 
liable for the injuries Winchester sustained working in a gear building away from 
the maritime terminal,155 the Fifth Circuit laid the framework for cases broadly 
interpreting the situs requirement of the LHWCA, until that same court revisited 
and overturned Winchester in 2013.156 
B.  Abandoning the Intent of Congress and Focusing on the Lexicon of the 
1972 Amendments to the LHWCA 
Rejecting each of the tests from Winchester, Brady-Hamilton, and Sea-Land 
Service, the Fourth Circuit, in 1995, created its own test: a rigid, textual 
interpretation of the amended LHWCA.157  The Fourth Circuit read the word 
 150. Id. at 514. 
 151. Id. (indicating that the totality of circumstances must be examined to determine the situs 
prong). 
 152. Id. at 514–15. 
 153. See id. at 514–16. 
 154. See id. at 514–15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
A broad interpretation of the maritime situs requirement reduces the number of workers 
walking in and out of coverage and promotes uniformity.  It also is in line with the 
congressional desire to extend coverage to those maritime chores that technology has 
moved ashore.  In addition, this interpretation is in keeping with the Supreme Court’s 
expansive approach to interpreting the amendments’ “employee” status test in Caputo 
and Pfeiffer.  Furthermore, a broad view of the situs test has been adopted in other 
circuits. 
Id. at 516 (footnote omitted). 
 155. See id. at 516. 
 156. See  New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 718 
F.3d 384, 394 (5th Cir. 2013) (overturning the Winchester line of cases); but see New Orleans 
(Gulfwide) Stevedores v. Turner, 661 F.2d 1031, 1038 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting presciently the 
“shifting sands” of the presumption in favor of the claimant for the situs requirement). 
 157. Sidwell v. Express Container Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1134, 1137–39 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e 
will interpret the [LHWCA] as it is written, and as we have been instructed by the Supreme Court 
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“adjoin” literally and determined that the situs of the accident had to fit within 
“the ordinary meaning of ‘adjoin’[:] ‘to lie next to,’ to ‘be in contact with,’ to 
‘abut upon,’ or to be ‘touching or bounding at some point.’”158  Applying this 
new, narrow interpretation, the court held that the injured employee did not meet 
the situs requirement because—although the company’s facility where the injury 
occurred was an “area” as defined in the LHWCA—the facility was not an 
“adjoining area.”159 
Citing the Sidwell court’s analysis of the legislative history of the 1972 
Amendments, the New Orleans Depot court believed a narrow interpretation of 
the situs requirement fulfilled the purpose of the 1972 Amendments, which was 
to cure the defect of longshore workers “walk[ing] in and out of LHWCA 
coverage as they walked the gangplank from ship to shore.”160  Applying this 
interpretation of the situs requirement to the facts of New Orleans Depot, the 
Fifth Circuit held that the injured employee did not suffer his injury in an area 
covered by the situs requirement while engaged in maritime activity.161 
C.  Workers in Today’s Maritime Industry Face Great Uncertainty Regarding 
Whether They Are Covered By Federal Workers’ Compensation Legislation 
As demonstrated by Jensen, longshore and harbor workers entered the 
twentieth century unsure of the compensation scheme for injuries sustained 
during maritime employment.162  Workers were caught in the void between state 
compensation laws, which stopped at the state’s terrestrial boundary, and an 
assumption that federal legislation governed injuries sustained while upon 
territorial waters.163  Congress took steps in 1972 to amend the LHWCA by 
instituting a second requirement in the Act.  Congress hoped this new situs 
requirement would cover injuries that occurred in areas around “the navigable 
waters of the United States.” 164   Subsequent court decisions interpreted 
Congress’ intent broadly and held routinely that the new situs requirement 
to do with respect to [the LHWCA].” (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 
469, 484 (1992))). 
 158. Id. at 1138 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 27 (1993)). 
 159. Id. at 1141 (internal quotation marks omitted). In its decision, the Fourth Circuit stated 
that the crux of the competing interpretations of the situs requirement of the LHWCA is that, “[t]he 
Supreme Court has not articulated a test for determining what is an ‘other adjoining area’ under the 
LHWCA.”  Id. at 1136. 
 160. New Orleans Depot Servs., Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 718 F.3d 
384, 391–92 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Sidwell, 71 F.3d at 1140) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161. Id. at 383–94. 
 162. See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917). 
 163. Id. (holding that state compensation laws may not supersede congressional authority, 
because “[e]qually well established is the rule that state statutes may not contravene an applicable 
act of Congress or affect the general maritime law beyond certain limits”). 
 164. See Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) 
(2012). 
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covered injuries sustained by maritime workers.165  Beginning in 1995, however, 
judicial decisions turned away from a broad interpretation of the situs 
requirement and steamed, instead, toward a narrower reading of congressional 
intent.166 
V.  A PROPOSAL TO END THE INCONSISTENCY 
Following the most recent major amendment to the LHWCA, courts were split 
on how to conduct a situs investigation; 167  however, they were split only 
regarding how best to interpret the LHWCA’s text broadly.168  It was evident 
that the inclusion of the situs requirement was not meant to destroy maritime 
workers’ claims.169 
An unjust situation did not transpire until narrow interpretations supplanted 
the broad interpretations of the Act. 170  Ultimately, geography became the 
demarcation line between maritime workers being compensated under anemic 
state compensation laws or not receiving compensation at all.171  Between the 
federal government, the state government, the maritime industry, the insurance 
industry, and the maritime worker, the maritime worker is likely the least able 
to shoulder the cost of an uncompensated injury. It is, therefore, essential that 
the Supreme Court provide guidance to bring predictability to the adjudication 
of maritime workers’ compensation claims.  The Supreme Court guided the 
circuits through interpretations of the status requirement of the LHWCA. It must 
do the same with the situs requirement. 
The most effective interpretation for the Supreme Court to follow is a broad 
reading of the situs requirement.  This interpretation of the requirement remains 
true to the intentions of Congress, because Congress sought to provide coverage 
for maritime workers injured on the job.172  Therefore, a mathematical bright 
line rule based on the ports and how far the ports extend from navigable waters 
could fully realize Congress’ intent.  While admittedly arbitrary, a bright line 
rule would bring to the industry and its members something they desperately 
lack—predictability.  The industry and its workers would be on notice regarding 
 165. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the courts’ broad interpretations of the LHWCA’s situs 
requirement). 
 166. See supra Part IV.B (expounding upon the courts’ decisions to interpret narrowly the 
LHWCA). 
 167. See supra notes 17–26 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra notes 17–26 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Merlin, supra note 6, at 152 (citing S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 13 (1972)) (“The 
legislative history of the 1972 Amendments indicates that the purpose of the ‘maritime 
employment’ test was to limit coverage for work-related injuries in the newly enlarged shoreside 
areas, not to condition coverage for work-related injuries on actual navigable water.”). 
 170. See Fitzhugh, supra note 12 (discussing the advent and impact of the circuit courts’ 
narrow interpretations of the LHWCA’s situs requirements). 
 171. See Pitre, supra note 15, at 1009–10 (providing an illustration of how a maritime worker 
could be compensated differently across the circuits). 
 172. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
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workers who were covered by the Act and workers who were not covered by the 
Act.  Companies operating current facilities would know whether their workers 
were covered by the LHWCA, and companies seeking to build new facilities 
would be able to choose whether they wanted their employees covered or not 
covered by the LHWCA.  Similarly, employees seeking work would be able to 
know which buildings were subject to LHWCA coverage and which buildings 
were not covered by the Act. 
Regardless of the outcome, the Supreme Court must speak clearly so a vital 
piece of workers’ compensation legislation is understood universally and 
applied consistently.  The ports of this country and the areas encompassed by its 
maritime terminals or their functional equivalents should be covered by the situs 
requirement of the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act.  Where 
no maritime port or functional equivalent is present, the situs requirement of the 
Act should cover an area extending one thousand feet from the banks of 
navigable waters. 173  Any doubts thereafter should be resolved in favor of 
covering the longshore worker, so as to be consistent with Congress’ initial 
purpose in passing the LHWCA.174 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The maritime industry, its companies, and its workers are laboring in an 
inequitable, unjust, and unpredictable environment.  What was once non-existent 
federal workers’ compensation coverage became imperfect coverage with the 
enactment of the original LHWCA.  The amended LHWCA filled the voids 
created unintentionally by the original Act.  Court opinions interpreted the 
amended LHWCA broadly in the decades following its enactment.  Recently, 
courts have been interpreting the LHWCA coverage requirements narrowly and 
have failed to distill a clear and uniform interpretation of the situs requirement. 
The Supreme Court should resolve this issue. The Court must harmonize the 
divergent interpretations of the situs requirement.  The Court did this with the 
LHWCA’s status requirement.  It should be done with the situs requirement.  A 
bright line interpretation of the LHWCA will allow the maritime industry, its 
companies, and its workers to predict more accurately the application of the 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. 
 
 
 173. One may argue 1000 feet from navigable waters is too far a distance, but the status 
requirement of the amended LHWCA will still act to exclude those people that Congress did not 
intend to be covered under the LHWCA.  The LHWCA was written and has been interpreted in 
such a way as to require both prongs of the coverage test be satisfied.  See supra note 5 and 
accompanying text; see also S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 16 (noting both the inclusionary and 
exclusionary aspects of the two prongs of the coverage requirements in the LHWCA).  Extending 
the situs 1000 feet from navigable water would simply be in keeping with the intentions of 
Congress.  See S. REP. NO. 92-1125, at 1 (discussing the purpose of the 1972 Amendments). 
 174. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text. 
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